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We find situations in which stronger organizational search capabilities can backfire, leading to lower
exploration within the alliance relationship, and hence to lower firm performance. Moreover, we show that
for higher levels of interdependence, coordination can become more critical for firm performance than
exploration: unless it is tied to coordination, exploration can be ineffective in alliance settings.
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ABSTRACT
We examine the perfonnance implications of selecting alternate modes of governance in interorganizational alliance relationships. While managers can choose from a range of modes to
govern alliances, prior empirical evidence offers limited guidance on the perfonnance impact of
this choice. We use an agent-based simulation of inter-firm decision making to complement
empirical studies in tllis area. Our results point to a complex interplay between interdependencies,
governance structures and finns' search capabilities: different patterns of interdependence create
varying needs with respect to coordination and exploration, while at the same time different
governance modes, coupled with organizational search capabilities, supply v arying degrees of
these factors; finn performance in an alliance relationship improves when the needs and supplies
of coordination and exploration are matched. We find situations in which stronger organizational
search capabilities can backfire, leading to lower exploration w ithin the alliance relationship, and
hence to lower firm perfonnance. Moreover we show that for higher levels of interdependence,
coordination can become more critical for finn perfonnance than exploration: unless it is tied to
coordination, exploration can be ineffective in alliance settings.
Running Head: Governing Collaborative Activity
Keywords: Alliances; governance modes; coordination; exploration; interdependence; simulation
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INTRODUCTION
Inter-firm collaborative relationships are a growing phenomenon with significant organizational
and performance consequences (Reuer, 2004). Engaging in such relationships requires
determining how to govern the shared activities -a particularly important consideration when the
activities associated with the collaboration interact with the other activities of the participating
finns. Broader finn-level consequences can often result from governance mode selection. In
resource-constrained enviromnents, for example, firms may be unable to invest in the capabilities
necessary to pursue different modes of governance across multiple alliance relationships. As a
result, developing a business model around a single, particular mode can become a necessary
strategic choice.
While governance mode choice can have strategic implications, there is limited direct
evidence for the impact of different modes on finn performance. Prior work in this area has
generally addressed two issues: first, does cooperative activity matter? And second, what factors
compel finns to select alternate modes of governance in cooperative settings? Empirical evidence
for the implications of cooperative activity has been mixed: while some work documents the
positive effects of such activity on firm perfonnance using metrics such as stock market returns
(Das, Sen and Sengupta, 1998) and patenting output (Shan, Walker and Kogut, 1994), other
studies suggest that cooperative activity plays a more limited role in influencing finn-level
outcomes relative to factors such as internal capabilities (Lee, Lee and Pennings, 2001 ). More
robust evidence exists with respect to the antecedent<> of such activity. Two streams of prior work
have addressed the detenninants of alliance governance: a transaction cost economics (TCE)
view, which generally concludes that more hierarchical fonns of governance are associated with
transactions characterized by increased appropriation hazards (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997);
and an organizational approach, which examines the choice between alternate modes of
governance taking into account finn-level considerations (e.g., Gulati and Singh, 1998; Kale and
Puranam, 2004; Dyer et al., 2004; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Aggarwal and Hsu, 2009).
Although ample work has assessed alliance governance mode determinants, less is known
about the perfonnance implications of difference modes. Sampson (2004) makes important
headway toward<> addressing this by focusing on the implications of 'governance misalignment'.
Using TCE as a theoretical prior, this study focuses on the innovation implications of governance
choices that run counter to TCE predictions. The empirical finding that misaligned choices can
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have adverse innovation effects is compelling, as it motivates the notion that mode choice has
perfonnance effects detennined in part by the nature of inter-fmn characteristics. Moreover, it
suggests the need for a deeper understanding of the mechanisms influencing finn performance as
governance modes vary.
Our central research question addresses this link between governance mode and
perfonnance: how does the governance mode used to manage decisions in the context ofan inter-

organizational relationship bet\-Veen t\-Vo firms impact firm performance? To examine this
question, we employ an agent-based simulation that enables us to develop a more nuanced view
of the implications of governance choice. Part of the motivation underlying this approach is to
better understand some of the factors underlying the implications of cooperative activity that may
be more difficult to address using empirical approaches. Prior studies exploring finn perfonnance
in alliance settings, for example, have explored moderating effects such as alliance activity type
(e.g. , marketing vs. technical) and relative fmn size, while abstracting away from the particular
implications of finn characteristics and governance mode. Omitting such characteristics may be
the reason for the mixed results around the implications of cooperative activity noted above. By
utilizing a simulation methodology, we are afforded a degree of flexibility in experimental design
not possible with alternative approaches.
We use a simulation model with the aim of generating a novel set of insight<> (following
from a set of assumptions) that can guide future theoretical and empirical work. To develop our
model we draw from a rich body of literature that has used agent-based simulations to address
issues of organizational strategy (e.g., Levinthal, 1997) and from prior work examining interorganizational relationships. We model a range of governance structures, different patterns of
interdependencies, and varying levels of organizational capabilities. To anchor our analytical
explorations, we first outline a conceptual framework of finn perfonnance, building on the
information processing and contingency theories of the fmn. With this framework in mind, we
then use the simulation to generate further insight into the mechanisms underlying the
perfonnance effects of alternate governance modes. ln the final section, we discuss theoretical
implications and outline several specific insights and hypotheses that emerge from this study. 1

1

Many of the theoretical mechanisms we discuss might also be relevant in intra-firm settings, and our
theoretical development and discussion moreover draw on a broad range of the organizational design literature
examining within-firm issues. Since our focus is on alliance governance, however, we construct a simulation
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THEORY AND LITERATURE
Our aim in this section is to develop a conceptual framework that describes a nmnber of
mechanisms underlying finn performance in alliance settings. We begin by discussing
governance mode choice and inter-finn interdependence; we then tum to the factors of
coordination and exploration. We motivate our framework with a discussion of prior literature,
including work on organization design and information processing. TI1e framework, in tum,
motivates the simulation model discussed in the subsequent section.
Governance modes and interdependence
An important question in any inter-organizational relationship is how to govern the shared

activities. An early stream of work examining the governance choice issue drew from transaction
cost theory (Williamson, 1975; Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). In this context,
appropriation concerns arising from contractual hazards become a central consideration. Gulati
and Singh (1998) pick up on this thread, discussing appropriation concerns as an important
determinant of governance structure, while at the same time suggesting that coordination costs
play an equally important role. They draw from the organization design literature (e.g.,
Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1977) to suggest that interdependence is a particularly important
factor in determining how finns structure alliance relationships. Interdependence in an alliance
setting can encompass factors such as sharing complementary teclmologies and production
facilities, as well as joint product development (these are among the activities Gulati and Singh
discuss in measuring interdependence).
The importance of interdependence both among activities m which finns are jointly
engaged and between tl1e finns ' alliance and non-alliance activities stems from the infonnation
processing needs of the interacting firms. In his discussion of intra-organizational design,
Galbraith (1977: 37) notes that "in order to coordinate interdependent roles, organizations have
invented mechanisms for collecting infonnation, deciding, and disseminating infonnation to
resolve conflicts and guide interdependent actions." Information plays a similar role in alliance

model that more closely mirrors situations involving two distinct and interacting firms. As a result, we make
assumptions around the nature of organizational interdependence and decision making that may be less
appropriate for an intra-firm setting.
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settings: just as greater levels of internal interdependence lead to higher task uncertainty and
increased infonnation processing need<> within an organization (Tushman and Nadler, 1978),
greater levels of interdependence within and between the activities of fmns in an alliance lead to
higher alliance-related infonnation processing needs. As a result, alliance design choices are
driven by the need to capture and effectively manage interdependence-related infonnation.
Bounded rationality (Simon, 1945; Cyert and March, 1963) in many ways underpins the
information processing perspective: if actors were unboundedly rational, a single decision maker
could simply optimize across all combinatorial possibilities; yet with limits on individual
information processing ability, a more decentralized approach will likely prevail (Mintzberg
1979). ln the context of alliance relationships, therefore, firms are likely to (at least partially)
decentralize decision making in order to deal with infonnation flows arising from inter-firm
interdependence.

As prior work examining within-firm organizational

structures

has

demonstrated, infonnation flows are a core consideration in optimally configuring organizations,
particularly with varying levels of decomposability (Burton and Obel, 1980; Simon, 1996). More
generally , just as environmental contingencies drive different choices of within-finn organization
(e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) we would expect that no single alliance governance choice
would apply equally effectively across all circumstances. Varying infonnation processmg
requirements associated with different patterns of interdependence between finns will likely
necessitate employing alternative structures to govern the associated decisions. This discussion
therefore suggests:

•

Proposition 1. The pattern ofactivity interdependence beflveenfirms in an alliance
creates performance differences among different alliance governance modes.

Coordination, exploration and firm performance
To understand how interdependence can influence the link between governance choice and
perfonnance, we seek to better understand the levers that finns employ to influence performance
in alliance settings. Coordination is one such lever: the nature and functioning of coordination
mechanisms and the associated failures to appropriately coordinate activities have been a central
set of concerns for both the classic and the more recent organization design literature (e.g.,
Simon, 1945; Galbraith, 1977, Burton and Obel, 1984; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). While
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many of these studies have focused on intra-finn interactions, work going back to (at least)
Schelling (1960) has discussed issues of coordination across multiple organizations. 1n the
particular context of alliance relationships, Gulati and Singh (1998) suggest that firms take into
account coordination concerns in making governance mode decisions. Moreover, a recent stream
of alliance research looking at finn adaptation and the development of routines over time
suggests that the ability to effectively coordinate activities among finns can be an important
driver of firm perfonnance (e.g., Zollo et al. (2002), Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam (2005)).
1n addition to the ability to coordinate among activities, a firm's ability to explore and
find new activities can be an important driver of performance in an alliance. Exploration is a core
element of the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963), with search processes
critical to a firm's ability to adapt and evolve (Nelson and Winter, 1982; March, 1991; Levinthal,
1997). As March (1991) suggests, exploration, a concept captured by ideas such as "search,
variation, risk taking, experimentation, play , flexibility, discovery, innovation," is critical for
organizations. Moreover, search can be exploratory to varying degrees, from narrow, local search
to broader search. The drivers of exploration have been addressed in a growing body of work,
with factors such as organizational structure shown to play an important role (e.g., Siggelkow and
Rivkin, 2005, 2006 and references therein). We build on this work in the present study, while at
the same time shifting the focus to exploration in an inter-organizational setting.

2

The prior literature suggests, therefore, that coordination and exploration have important
effects on finn performance. Moreover, the degree of coordination and exploration that will be
required in an alliance setting is, in turn, likely to be influenced by the pattern of inter-firm
interdependence: greater interdependence increases the challenges of coordination (e.g.,
Galbraith, 1977) and requires a higher degree of exploration because interdependencies create
more rugged perfonnance landscapes that can cause firms to get stuck with very suboptimal
choices (e.g., Levinthal, 1997). This discussion therefore suggests:

2

Our definition of "exploration" refers to organizational actions related to finding new activity configurations.
Our use of the term exploration is thus consistent with what is more generally termed "search" in prior literature
(see, e.g. , Siggelkow and Rivkin ·s (2006) discussion of exploration) . March's (1991) further distinction between
exploitation and exploration is embedded implicitly in our model (see below), as we vary the breadth of search
undertaken by managers from narrow (akin to "exploitation" ) to broad (akin to "exploration" in March's (1991)
more particular sense) .
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•

Proposition 2a. D(ff"erent patterns o{"activity interdependence befl~v·eenjirms create
different need~ .for coordination and exploration in an alliance relationship.
While interdependence patterns create varying needs for coordination and exploration, the

supply of these factors is influenced both by the alliance governance structure and by
organizational capabilities. M ore specifically, in alliance relationships, a primary consideration is
the degree of autonomy held by the individual finns. Two core considerations in such a setting
are ( 1) the infonnation flows enabling individual actors to make decisions, and (2) the overarching processes governing these decisions. We refer to the collective set of factors that
characterize the underlying infonnation flow and decision processes as the alliance governance
structure, and suggest that the particular structure employed influences the supply of coordination
and exploration in inter-organizational relationships. We discuss these structures in more detail in
the following section.
Beyond the particular governance structure employed, internal firm capabilities are also
likely to play an important role. A broad stream of the organizational strategy literature has
focused on the role of capabilities in the fonnation, governance and performance of collaborative
relationships (e.g., Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002; Zollo et al., 2002; Colombo, 2003; Leiblein and
Miller, 2003; M ayer and Salomon, 2006). 1n this paper, we conceptualize capabilities as a set of
factors that enable an organization to engage, to varying degrees, in the search for b etter
configurations of performance-relevant activities. We use the term "organizational search
capabilities" to denote these factors in our conceptual framework and simulation model. 3 Such
capabilities represent the end product of investments by firms in their ability to generate new
ideas and evaluate alternative courses of action. As a result, these capabilities may be static in the
context of an individual alliance relationship, but adjustable over time as fmns alter their
investments in decision evaluation resources. This discussion thus suggests that as finns seek to
respond to the coordination and exploration needs arising from inter-finn interdependence they
will draw on the joint effects of governance modes and organizational search capabilities. As a
result, we have:

3

We defer a more detailed discussion of these capabilities to the Simulation Model section, where we describe
the particular types of such capabilities we model in this paper.
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•

Proposition 2h. D([f'erent governance structures and organizational search capabilities

supply· different degrees ofcoordination and exploration in an alliance relationship.
Finally, as much ofthe organizations literature (e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith,

1977; Burton and Obel, 1995; Volberda, 1996) collectively indicates, higher performance stems
from situations in which firms are adequately equipped to deal with the demands arising from
their particular form of interdependence. As our discussion has suggested, in the case of alliance
relation ships, coordination and exploration are core considerations. Moreover, as Tushman and
Nadler ( 1978: 6 19) note, "too much capacity will be redundant and costly; too little capacity will
not get the job done". Thus, finns in an alliance will be more likely to achieve higher
perfonnance when tl1ey are able to strike a balance between the needs and supply of coordination
and exploration. This discussion thus suggests:

•

Proposition 3. F irm performance in an alliance relationship improves when coordination
and exploration need~ are matched with the degree ofcoordination and exploration
supplied.

The conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 1 summarizes our discussion thus far: The
demands for coordination and exploration are inherently influenced by the pattern of
interdependence among the activities in which the finns involved in the inter-organizational
relationship are engaged. As interdependence increases, so too will the need to coordinate actions
among finns; similarly, a higher degree of interdependence will create greater landscape
complexity, necessitating higher levels of exploration (e.g., Levinthal,

1997). While

interdependence has implications for coordination and exploration demands, governance m ode
and organizational search capabilities have supply implications for these factors: mode choice
affects the nature and extent of coordination among firms, as well as the ability of firms to
explore their environment. Likewise, organizational search capabilities affect the supply of
exploration and, in tl1e interplay witl1 tl1e chosen governance mode, coordination. We turn in the
next section to describing a simulation model that enab les us to explore this framework in greater
detail.
Insert Figure 1 about here
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SIMULATION MODEL
To develop our simulation model, we build on and extend prior work that has used the NK
framework (Kauffinan, 1993) to model firm decision making (e.g., Levinthal, 1997; Lenox,
Rockart and Lewin, 2006). This literature generally envisions firms as sets of interdependent
choices, an approach characteristic of an activity systems view of organizations (Porter, 1996;
Siggelkow, 2001, 2002). ln particular, a firm is seen as having to resolve a set of N 'policy
choices. ' For instance, a finn may have to decide whether to increase its product variety, whether
to engage in various marketing campaigns, or whether to increase it<> budget for sales force
training. The NK model further assumes that the benefit that is derived from each policy choice is
affected by K other policy choices. For instance, the value that an increase in product variety may
generate could depend on whether the sales force has been recently trained, or not. ln sum, each
unique configuration of tl1e N choices generates a particular perfonnance value. Thus, we can
imagine a perfonnance landscape on N+ 1 dimensions: N 'horizontal' dimensions representing the
space of all possible alternatives for each of tl1e N policy choices, and one 'vertical' dimension
representing tl1e perfonnance level resulting from each overall choice configuration (of tl1e N
decisions). Landscape complexity depends on interactions among the policy choices, and firms
search the landscape attempting to move to higher perfonnance levels by altering individual
choices.
The two principal components of NK models are tlms ( 1) a mechanism to create
perfonnance landscapes (i.e. , tl1e mapping from choices to performance), and (2) a set of decision
rules that describe how fmns search the landscape (i.e., how finns generate and assess alternative
choice configurations). ln describing our model, we focus first on extending the concepts of
interdependence and perfonnance landscapes to a two-finn setting. We then discuss our model of
search and governance in tl1is context.

Patterns of interdependence
We model two firms interacting witl1in the context of an alliance relationship. Finns 1 and 2 are
each composed of a set of binary policy choices which we denote as F 1 and F:J. We decompose
the policy choice sets of each finn into two groups: ( 1) non-alliances choices under the control of
the respective finn and (2) choices that are part of the alliance relationship. For Finn 1, we tlms
have F 1 = {NJ. A 1 } , where N 1 represents the set of non-alliance choices, and A 1 represents the set
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of alliance-dedicated activities in which Finn 1 is engaged. For example, an R&D alliance
between two teclmology firms might consist of joint work towards a particular product. Choices
with respect to this R&D alliance that Finn 1 has to resolve, e.g., whether or not to dedicate a
particular engineer to this alliance, would be included in A 1. Other choices that do not fall into tl1e
province of the alliance such as how much to invest in branding an existing product would be
included in N 1. We denote the number of policy choices in sets N 1 and A 1 with n 1 and a 1, and
define analogous values for Finn 2. TI1e total number of policy choices in the system oftwo finns
is thus N

=n +a +aJ+nJ.
1

1

Having defined the policy choices for each finn, we can define the pattern of interactions
among them. Figure 2a illustrates an interaction matrix for two finns with n 1=4, a 1=2, aJ=2 , and
nJ=4. TI1e matrix specifies which policy choices are affected by which other choices. An X in row

i, columnj, signifies that the resolution of the j th policy choice affects the value of the / 11 policy

choice. Using this matrix, we can specify exactly which policy choices affect which other policy
choices. For instance, in the example given in Figure 2a, d 1 is affected by d 1 through d.~- Likewise,
d 9 is affected by d 5 through dn For ease of notation, we denote individual policy decisions by d;,

where i is indexed from 1 toN, and sequentially number the decisions in the sets N 1, A 1, A J, and
NJ. Thus for Figure 2a, we hav e N 1=(d1 ,dJ,d3 ,d4) , A 1=(d5,d 6) , AJ=(d7 ,d8 ) , and NJ=(d9,d 10,d11 ,dJJ).

We further define the full vector of decisions in the entire system of the two fmns as d

=(d

1,

dJ, .. . , dN)- Since decisions are binary, dis thus a string of N O's and 1 's.

To analyze the role played by different patterns of interdependence on optimal
governance mode choice, we construct a set of specific interdependence patterns. These patterns
follow a logical sequence, increasing in overall complex ity, with the differences between any two
consecutive patterns arising from the addition of a particular type of interdependence. Figure 2b
shows the patterns we use, with shaded areas representing the presence of interactions. (Each
shaded "box" in Figure 2b is completely filled with X ' s.) We model a system of 12 policy
choices with n 1=4 , a 1=2, aJ=2 and nJ=4. Pattern 1 is "fully decomposable," i.e., it has interactions
occurring solely within each group of policy choices. For instance, choices in N 1 only affect other
choices in N 1 ; similarly for choices in A 1 , AJ, and N J. Pattern 2, "pure alliance interaction,"
introduces interactions among the alliance choices of the two finns, i.e., between A 1 and AJ. Tims,
in this pattern all the activities within the alliance affect each other, but none of the alliance
activities interact with any of the non-alliance activities. Pattern 3, "finn-alliance interaction,"
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introduces interactions among all the alliance and non-alliance choices within each fmn. Thus, in
this case, choices within A1 and A:? interact with choices within N 1 and N.J. All activities within the
alliance continue to interact with each other. (The pattern depicted in Figure 2a corresponds to
Pattern 3.) Lastly, in Pattern 4, "full interdependence," all activities, even the non-alliance
activities of the two finns interact with each other.4
Insert Figure 2 about here

Performance landscapes
We turn next to the mechanism for assessing perfonnance in our model. Prior literature (e.g.,
Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003) has used the ' contributions' of individual policy
choices to describe perfonnance in an NK setting. We follow a similar approach. For each policy
choice d,. in our system, we construct a contribution value function, C,.. The contribution value
function takes as arguments each of the k ;+ 1 choices affecting d; (this includes d; itself, as well as
the other k ; choices affecting d; as defined by the interaction matrix). Each contribution value
function C,. is constructed as follows: for each unique configuration of policy choice d,. and the k,.
other choices affecting it, we draw a random 'contribution value' from the unifonn distribution
[0,1 ].5 Once all possible contribution values for each individual choice are defmed, the
perfonnance for any particular set of policy choices is computed as tl1e sum of the contribution
values associated witl1 these choices.
To reduce statistical artifacts that could arise from the stochastic nature ofthe landscape
generation process, we nonnalize perfonnance by the highest value possible on any given
landscape. Let d* be the policy choice configuration that leads to the highest perfonnance IT*,
i.e., IT*= L:~, C;(d*). Then, for instance, if the performance of Finn 1 is dctcnnincd only by the
contributions of the first six policy choices, the performance of Finn 1 for any choice
configuration dis given by

L::~, C; (d) jrr * . In the case of an alliance between Finn 1 and Finn 2

4
While this set of patterns is not exhau~tive of the full set of possible interdependencies, they are sufficient for
our purpose in that they enable us to create varying types of coordination needs that we can then systematically
examine.
5
A s an example, if the interaction matrix has 8 X's in row i (including the X in column i), then the contribution
value function C; can take on 2R=256 possible values for C; depending on how the vector d is configured (i.e.,
C,( d) will depend only on the values of the 8 choices noted by X's in the interaction mat rix).
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involving policies 4 through 8, Finn l's performance would be detennined by the contributions
of both Finn 1's non-alliance policy choices (d1 through d4) and by the policy choices of the
alliance (d5 through d8 ). For instance, if Finn l obtains portion a of the alliance perfonnance,
Finn l 's overall perfonnance would be computed as

(L::=I C ; (d) + aL:~=5 C, (d) )jrr * .

Agents and search capabilities
We tum now to the set of decision making rules that govern agents' behavior in our simulation.
We define an agent as a decision maker having authority over some subset of policy choices in
the two-finn system. For in..-;tance, a particular agent might have authority (and care about the
perfonnance of) all of the non-alliance activities of Finn 1. One should note that we use the tenn
"agent" for expositional simplicity. An "agent" in our model need not be (and in practice rarely
would be) a single person. An agent in our model is the relevant "decision-making-body" that is
responsible for making decisions concerning a set of activities, and thus could be a steering
committee, a set of managers, etc.
For a given simulation run, we begin by placing the agents at a random point on the
landscape (i.e., assigning random starting values to their policy choices). In each subsequent
period, the agents make decisions whether to alter the policy choices under their control (i.e., to
change a policy from a 0 to l , or vice versa). This is done by evaluating a set of possibilities,
which is influenced by the organizational search capabilities, and selecting the best option from
this set. The detennination of what constitutes a 'best option' is, as we will describe below,
dependent on the particular governance structure. Before discussing the governance structures in
more detail, we describe our conceptualization of organizational search capabilities, which we
model as the ability of agents to generate and evaluate alternative configurations for the set of
policy choices they control. This set of parameters can be thought of as the degree to which
organizational decision-making units are endowed with resources necessary to make decisions in
an alliance context.
We model two dimensions of such capabilities: (1) the ability to make simultaneous
decisions over a larger vs. smaller nmnber of the policy choices controlled, which we term the
'search radius' as per prior literature (e.g., Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005), and (2) the ability to
evaluate a larger vs. smaller nmnber of alternatives in a given period.
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For the search radius (parameter SR), we model a base case in which agents can change
only a single policy choice in each period (SR = 1), as well as a more complex case in which
agents can change up to two policy choices simultaneously in each period (SR = 2). For the
nmnber of alternatives (parameter ALT), we model a case where agents only evaluate a single,
randomly chosen alternative in each period (ALT = 1), as well as a more complex case where all
alternatives that lie within the search radius are evaluated (ALT =max). For example, assume an
agent controls three policies that are currently configured as 000. lfthe agent's search radius is 1,
and she evaluates all alternatives, she considers 100, 010, and 001. 1f she evaluates only a single
alternative, she will randomly pick one oftl1ese, e.g., 010. lfher search radius is 2, she can also
consider options that are different from tl1e current configuration in two policies such as 110. In
this case, were she to evaluate all alternative in her search radius, she would evaluate

iC + ~C

= 6 alternatives. ln sum, we model four different levels of organizational capabilities. Level A:
SR = 1 & ALT = 1; Level B : SR = 1 & ALT =max; Level C: SR = 2 & ALT = 1; Level D: SR =
2 &ALT=max.

Governance modes
We turn next to the different governance modes, which detennine the specifics of the decision
making process. We construct these modes along four dimensions: (1) number of decision makers
(agents), (2) order of decision making, (3) metrics used to evaluate the implications of choices,
and ( 4) nature of oversight and hierarchy around the decision making process. These dimensions
represent key elements of organization and alliance design (Simon, 1945; Galbraith, 1977; Reuer,

2004), enabling us to create a range of governance modes tlmt differ in tl1e underlying
information flow within and across organizations. We discuss the motivation underlying each
dimension and the resulting governance modes in tl1e remainder of this section.
The number of decision makers in the system is an important dimension of variance in
structuring alliance governance. Since we are modeling a two-finn system, having two separate
decision makers, one for each fmn, is a natural baseline. Alternatively, a more integrated lev el of
governance might entail having a single decision maker, while a situation in which there are two
decision makers for the finns, along with a third decision maker for tl1e alliance function, would
be a natural characteristic of hybrid governance fonns. A three-agent model might thus have a
decision-making body specific to alliance policy choices (e.g., a joint committee from both firms
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managing the alliance activities). As a second dimension of variance we consider the question of
how decision making is ordered, i.e., who gets priority in the decision making process. Decision
making order has implications for information flow within organizations, and as discussed in
depth in the previous section, such issues are likely to be central to the governance of interorganizational relationships.
The third dimension of variance relates to the metrics used by individual agents to make
decisions. Such decision metrics can be thought of as the incentives for individual organizational
units, which derive from the particular contractual features of the alliance (e.g., Robinson and
Stuart, 2007 ). We model decision metrics (which are defined solely by the governance mode) as
the set of contribution values an agent takes into account in making choices. As an example, in
one particular governance mode an agent will consider just the contribution values of the
decisions over which she has control. In an alternate governance mode, the agent will consider
not only the contribution values of her own decisions, but also some portion of the contribution
values of other agents' decisions.6
Finally, the fourth dimension of variance w e consider is the nature of hierarchy among
agents in the model. Alliances can incorporate elements ofhierarchical governance (e.g., Hennart
1993) such that decisions taken by one agent need to be ratified by another before they can be
implemented. Such hierarchy can, like the decision metrics, derive from the particular contractual
arrangements of the alliance. It is different, however, in that it describes the overall organization
of decision-making within the organization, rather than the more narrowly-prescribed underlying
incentives for individual agents.
Having described the four dimensions along which we model the governance of a
particular relationship, we now describe the governance structures we use in our analysis (Figure
3). We model four structures, which we tenn 'modular', 'self-governing alliance' , 'ratified
alliance', and 'integrated'. The modular and integrated fonns lie at opposite ends of the
governance spectrum. With the modular form, there are two agents, each controlling the policy

6

Defining agents' decision metrics in this way implies that we abstract away from a direct analysis of factors
such as shirking that may result from, for example, under-enforcement of contracts. Although agents do act
opportunistically in that their profit calculations consider only their own pre-defined set of contribution values to
the possible detriment of the other agents and the system as a whole, we do not directly model situations where
issues of trust are at play, or where agents directly seek to mislead. This is consistent with the notion of selfinterest in, for example Klein, Crawford and A lchian ( 1978), but may not include the ' guile' component of
Williamson's ( 1975) definition of opportunism, where there are hazards associated with the contract it'ielf.
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choices of either Finn 1 or Finn 2 (thus, in our model, six policy choices for each agent). These
agents make choices simultaneously, and only consider the profits for their own finn in making
decisions,

L;~, C; (d ) jrr. * and L;~7 C; (d) jrr. * , respectively . This is a simple case of an anns-

length inter-organizational relationship with no formal decision making structure to govern joint
activities. At the other end of the spectrum, we have the integrated mode, where a single agent
manages choices for both Finns 1 and 2 (thus, 12 total policy choices in our model). In this case,
the agent takes into account the total combined profit of Finns 1 and 2, L;~, C;(d)

jrr. * , and the

individual finns thus operate as a quasi-integrated entity.
In addition, we model two hybrid alliance fonns, both of which have an alliance manager

who manages the alliance choices (the four choices in the sets A 1 and AJ in our model), while
agents for Firms 1 and 2 manage the non-alliance choices of the two finns (N1 and N J
respectively). ln both cases, the alliance function takes into account only its own profits

L:=

5

C; ( d)

jrr. * when making decisions.

Each individual finn, in turn, takes into account the

profits associated w ith its own choices, along with a portion ( a) of the alliance profit (we set a
to

'l2
12

(
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m

our

analysis),

1.e.,

(L::,c;(d) +~ L;=5 C,(d))/rr *

for

Firm

and

I,

C, (d) +.!_""x
2 L...,=)_C, (d)) /rr.* for Finn 2. The main difference between the two alliance

modes lies in the degree of importance placed on the agendas of the individual finns relative to
the agenda of the alliance. ln the self-governing alliance mode, the alliance agent is allowed to
move first, and the agents for Finns 1 and 2 move second, know ing the alliance's move in the
current period. Thus, in this governance mode, the agenda of the alliance is given a high priority.
By contrast, in the ratified alliance mode, the agents for Finns 1 and 2 move first,
followed by the alliance agent, who knows the choices made by the two fmns in the current
period. The alliance agent, however, cannot directly implement changes in policy choices. Rather,
the agent ranks tl1e available alternatives and sends this ranked set to the two finn agents, who
must 'ratify' the alliance agent's proposals. Ratification requires tlmt both firm agents accept an
alliance proposal; a fmn agent accepts a proposal if the proposal does not reduce profit for the
agent (conditional on the move the agent already made at the start of the period). In this case, the
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agendas of Firms 1 and 2 come first, and are accounted for as the alliance proposals are
considered.
Insert Figure 3 about here

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We begin this section by explaining our analytic approach and presenting a number of initial
results. We then focus on interdependence, governance structure and capabilities in more detail,
outlining how these factors impact the demand and supply of coordination and exploration. In this
context, we develop a set of metrics for coordination and exploration that allow us to more
precisely show the underlying mechanisms at work. With these metrics, we then discuss the
mechanisms underlying the relationship between appropriate governance choice and patterns of
interdependence.

Analytic approach and motivating results
We conducted a broad range of simulations aimed at understanding the implications of joint
variation in interdependence, exploration ability and governance mode. As noted previously, we
model a 12-policy choice system of 2 finns in which n 1=4, a 1=2, a]=2, and n]=4. Since the
system itself, along witl1 the factors we model (like the patterns of interdependence), is symmetric
for botl1 firms, tl1e perfonnance results for tl1e two finns in tl1e system are equal when run over a
large nmnber of landscapes. To facilitate comparison with the integrated structure (which is
comprised of all 12 policy choices), we report v alues for tl1e full system. Perfonnances of
individual finns are simply Y2 oftl1e values reported for tl1e entire system.
Each 'period' in the simulation consists of the agents making a set of decisions with
respect to their activities as per the governance mode under which they are operating (see Figure
3).7 We run tl1e simulation for 200 periods on a given landscape in order to observe the long-run
perfonnance of tl1e fmns in tl1e system. To ensure that our results are not driven by statistical

7

For example, with the Ratified Alliance mode, the following happens within a single period: the agents for
Finns 1 and 2 simultaneously make a decision with respect to their activity sets N 1 and N 2; the alliance then
evaluates a lternatives for their activity set A 1-A 2 (taking into account the new choices within N 1 and N 2) and
sends a ranked set of the alternatives to the agents for Firms 1 and 2. Finally, the Firm 1 and 2 agents decide
whether to ratify the choice made by the alliance.
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artifacts, we repeat each simulation 10,000 times. Thus any reported performance value for a
particular time period (e.g., period 200) on a particular pattern of interdependence is an average
over 10,000 simulation runs (i.e., landscapes). In general, except where explicitly noted
otherwise, reported perfonnance differences are statistically significant at the 1% (or lower)
confidence level.
We begin the analysis by examining the perfonnance outcomes of the various governance
fonns under Pattern 1, the fully decomposable pattern. Figure 4 illustrates the performance of the
four governance modes on this interdependence pattern for the four different levels of
organizational capability. For capability level A (narrow search radius and one alternative
evaluated in each period), in the short run, the integrated mode has the lowest level of
perfonnance, while the alliance modes perfonn best. (For this pattern, the two alliance modes
generate the same performance; hence their lines are indistinguishable in the Figure.) In the long
run, however, each of the governance modes conv erges to the same level of perfonnance. A
broadening ofthe search radius (moving from capability level A to level C) preserves the relative
short-run differences between governance modes, while enabling each of the modes to arrive at a
higher long-run level of performance. An increase in the number of alternatives (moving from
level A to level B, or from C to D) increases the speed with which the governance forms
converge to the long-run maximum, yet does not affect the level of the long-run perfonnance.
The Pattern 1 results are directly linked to its decomposable nature, i.e., to the fact that there
are no interdependencies either between the individual finns and the alliance, or between the
finns themselves. As a result, perfonnance speed is driven by the number of agents in the system,
since each agent is able to act in parallel and independent of the others. The integrated structure,
which relies on one central agent to make all decisions, thus has the lowest short-run
perfonnance, while the two alliance forms, each of which has three agents who can work in
parallel, have the highest short-run performance. The modular fonn, with two agents, falls in the
middle. In the long run, however, given that the system can be fully decomposed, each mode
eventually arrives at the same perfonnance level. Changes in organizational capability operate as
expected: an increase in the number of alternatives increases the speed with which each mode
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mcreases its perfonnance, while an increased search radius enables all finns to reach higher
perfonnance levels over time. 8
Insert Figure 4 about here

Turning next to Figure 5, we examine the perfonnance of the different governance modes
on Pattern 4 , the fully interdependent pattern, applying the same varying levels of organizational
capabilities as before. Here, the results are much more complex. Turning first to the case of
capability level A , we see that in contrast to the Pattern 1 case, performance across the four
governance modes differs in the long run. In addition, modes vary in their relative performance
over time. The integrated mode initially outperfonns the other three modes; in the long run,
however, it is the lowest perfonning mode. The modular fonn, by contrast, initially
underperforms, but is the best in the long run. Likewise, as we vary organizational capabilities,
we can observe complex changes: an increase in either search radius or the munber of alternatives
that are considered in each period is beneficial to the integrated fonn in the long run. By contrast,
the modular fonn suffers as organizational capabilities are increased along either of these
dimensions. Lastly, while tl1e self-governing alliance outperfonns the ratified alliance when the
nmnber of considered alternatives is high (capability levels B and D), the ratified alliance has
higher perfonnance, at least in the short run, when the search radius is high and the nmnber of
considered alternatives is low (capability level C).
Insert Figure 5 about here

The results of Patterns 1 and 4 illustrate several points. First, w e find initial support for
Proposition 1: patterns of interdependence can have a significant impact on the relative value of
individual governance modes. Second, once the pattern of interdependence is not simple
anymore, the relationship between governance mode and perfonnance is not triv ial, especially
when one takes into account different levels of organizational capabilities and measures
perfonnance at different time points. To gain a better understanding of the results, and to identify

8

Since interdependencies exist within the set of activities each manager controls (e.g., within N 1), each manager
still may get stuck on a local peak within her 'sub-landscape.' An increase in the search radius reduces the
probability that managers will get stranded on such low, local peaks, and hence increases long-run performance .
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the underlying mechanisms that create tllis complex set of findings, it is helpful to retum to our
conceptual model of coordination and exploration. In particular, we will describe in detail the
demands tlmt different patterns of interdependence create with respect to coordination and
exploration and how well the different governance modes match these demands. As we will
show, the degree to which coordination and exploration demands are matched can help explain
observed perfonnance heterogeneity.

Coordination and exploration as underlying mechanisms
To study the effect of interdependence patterns on the performance created by different
governance modes, we focus on how particular patterns differ systematically in where
interdependencies occur: between alliance and non-alliance choices; within alliance policy
choices; and between the non-alliance choices of tl1e two firms. These three classes of
interdependencies create three corresponding dimensions of coordination demands: ( 1)
coordination between tl1e individual finns and the alliance; (2) coordination within tl1e alliance
itself; and (3) coordination between tl1e non-alliance activities of Finns 1 and 2. As summarized
in Panel A of Table 1, the only coordination required by Pattern 1 is among a few choices w ithin
the alliance, i.e., witl1in A 1 and within A 2 • Pattern 2, which contains also interactions between the
alliance activities of the individual firms (i.e., between A 1 and A 2 ) , requires more intra-alliance
coordination. Pattern 3 requires additional coordination between the individual firms ' and the
alliance activities. Finally, Pattern 4 demands coordination between the non-alliance activities for
Finns 1 and 2 as well.
Patterns 1 - 4 not only differ in their locations of interdependencies, but also in the
nmnber of interdependencies. Generally, the larger tl1e number of interdependencies, tl1e more
"rugged" a performance landscape becomes, i.e., the more local peaks it contains (e.g., Levinthal,

1997). (A policy configuration d is a local peak if all policy configurations that differ from d in
only one policy choice have lower perfonnance.) The higher the number of local peaks, the
higher the risk of getting stranded on a low-perfonning local peak; and consequently, the higher
the level of exploration needed to reach high performance. As a result, the nmnber of local peaks
tl1at are contained in a landscape is a good measure for exploration demands. The right-most
colmnn of Panel A of Table 1 contains tl1e nmnber of local peaks for each interdependence
pattern. As expected, the number oflocal peaks increases from 18 for Pattern 1 to 315 for Pattern
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4. (For companson, a landscape with 12 policy choices has

i

2

=

4,096 possible policy

configurations.) In sum, the patterns differ in the types and degree of coordination, as well as the
degree of exploration they demand.
We now tum our attention to the different governance modes. Variation across these
modes along the four key design dimensions (nmnber of agents; order of decision making;
decision evaluation metrics; and oversight and hierarchy) generates substantial differences in the
types and degree of coordination. To facilitate comparison with the different types of
coordination that are demanded by the different interdependence patterns, Panel B of Table 1
smmnarizes the coordination that is supplied by the different governance structures along the
three coordination dimensions (individual firm-alliance; within alliance; and between Firms 1 and
2).
The modular mode supplies very little coordination along any of the coordination
dimensions. Non-alliance activ ities are completely uncoordinated between the two finns as
decisions are made simultaneously and purely independently of one another. Likewise, the
modular mode has very little within-alliance coordination. Since own-finn alliance activ ities are
controlled by each firm (for instance Finn 1 controls d5 and ~), a limited amount of coordination
is created between at least a subset of alliance activities (i.e., Finn 1 coordinates between d5 and
d6, and Finn 2 between d 7 and d 8 ). Similarly, only limited coordination occurs between alliance
activities and the non-alliance activities of each firm. For instance, Finn 1 coordinates between
d 1-<4 and ds and d6, but ignores the interactions between d 1-<4 and d7 and ds.
Within the self-governing alliance, strong coordination is achieved among the alliance
activities, since they are all controlled by a single alliance agent. A small amount of coordination
also occurs between the non-alliance activ ities and the alliance activities. This coordination arises
from the sequential moves within a given period and from the individual ±inns' taking into
account a portion (a.) of tl1e alliance performance in making their decisions. Thus, when finn
managers make decisions concerning the non-alliance activities, they would not implement policy
changes that (drastically) undermine alliance performance. No coordination, however, is achieved
between the non-alliance activities of both finns.
The ratification alliance mode adds more coordination; here, in addition to the
coordination sources mentioned for the self-governing alliance mode, the additional ratification
step adds greater coordination between tl1e non-alliance policies and the alliance, since the
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alliance is not allowed to implement choices that might be very detrimental to one of the finns.
Finally, the integrated mode, with a single decision maker, achieves full coordination across all
decisions.
To measure in our simulations the amount of coordination that is provided by the various
governance modes given a particular interdependence pattem and organizational capability level,
we observe the number of times that a coordination failure occurs. We measure coordination

failures as incidents in which total profits decline from the prior period. Thus, in such a period,
the various agents implemented policy changes that in their entirety reduced overall profits, a
clear form of coordination failure.
We now tum our attention to exploration. Exploration is affected by both the governance
structure and the organizational capability level. Different structures create different degrees of
exploration by imposing higher or lower levels of decision-making constraints on agents. In the
modular case, for example, the two agents act purely independently, without regard to the effects
that their actions may have on the other finn' s perfonnance. Such independence can result in very
high exploration. In contrast, the integrated firm, always having to take all ramifications into
account, tends to be much less explorative. Exploration supply for the alliance modes lies in
between. The self-governing mode creates exploration through the unfettered alliance agent, who
is allowed to move first and implement choices from a purely parochial point of view. The
ratified alliance structure, one would expect, creates less exploration. In this case, while the
alliance is still allow ed to make parochial evaluations of alternatives, the ratification step
dampens tl1e exploration the firms engage in. Table 1, Panel C summarizes this discussion.
Insert Table 1 about here

The effects of organizational capabilities on exploration are straightforward at tl1e level of
individual agents. An increase in the search radius increases the range of possible alternatives that
an agent might consider, and thus increases exploration. Likewise, an increase in the nmnber of
alternatives that an agent considers increases, at least in tl1e short run, tl1e area of the landscape an
agent might explore. How an increase in exploration at the level of individual agents translates,
however, to exploration at the level of tl1e organization can be less straightforward. For instance,
as Siggelkow and Rivkin (2006) have shown, increases in exploration at a low-level within a
hierarchical organization can backfire and create less exploration for tl1e organization as a whole.
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To measure in our simulations the degree to which exploration is supplied by different
combinations

of governance

structures

and

organizational

capabilities

for

different

interdependence patterns, we create two measures: percent of choices evaluated, and number of

sticking points. We construct the percent of choices evaluated by calculating the total number of
different contribution values (C;'s) considered by agents in the system over time, and dividing
this by the total number of contribution values that exist for a landscape. (For instance, Pattern 1
involves 144 contribution values while Pattern 4 involves 49,152 contribution values.) The
second exploration metric, sticking points, measures the nmnber of points on the landscape from
which the fmn will not make a move (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). Higher values of this metric
suggest a governance structure-capability combination that is less prone to broader exploration.

Optimal governance with varying interdependence
Anned with a more detailed understanding of exploration and coordination supplies and
demands, and with our battery of coordination and exploration measures, we n ow return to a
more in-depth discussion of the Pattern 1 and 4 results. We begin with Pattern 1; Table 2 reports
the perfonnance results for Pattern 1 at periods 10 and 200, along with the metrics discussed
above for exploration and coordination. We begin by noting that this pattern, being fully
decomposable, requires little coordination and exploration. On tllis pattern, for any given level of
organizational capability, all governance modes perfonn equally well in tl1e long run, reaching
the same level of performance over time. There are instances, however, in which performance
differs across modes in the short run.
To understand the sources of tl1e perfonnance differences, we tum to the metrics for
coordination and exploration. A'i the right-most column of Table 2 indicates, none of the
governance modes experiences any coordination failure on tl1is pattern. As a result, perfonnance
variation is solely driven by differences in exploration generated by the different modes. As a
matter of fact, the performance ordering of the four governance modes in period 10, for all levels
of organizational capability, is exactly the ordering along tl1e exploration metric percent

C!l

choices evaluated by period 10. For instance, for capability level A, this exploration metric is
lowest for the integrated mode at 25%, and highest for the self-governing and ratified alliance
modes at 40%, with the modular mode in between at 35%. This is consistent with tl1e ordering of
perfonnance values at period 10.
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T11e perfonnance benefits in early periods for the alliance modes illustrate the benefit of
splitting activities among different agents in the system; because the various activities can be
easily decomposed in this pattern, a larger nmnber of agents who can work in parallel results in a
higher degree of exploration without resulting in coordination failures across activities. In the
long run, however, at Period 200, the four governance modes reach the same level of exploration,
and indeed the same level of performance.
With this simple pattern of interdependence, increases in organizational capabilities also
create expected effects. An increase in the search radius (mov ing from capability level A to level

C) leads primarily to an increase in long-run exploration and, consequently, to higher long-run
perfonnance levels. The percent

~f choices

evaluated metric increases from about 45% in level A

to about 81% for level C; likewise, the number of sticking points decline for all governance
modes from about 18 to 2. At tl1e same time, an increase in the nmnber of alternatives considered
(capability levels A to B , and C to D) results primarily in increased speed with which the various
governance modes converge to the long-run performance level. With capability levels B and D,
for all governance modes, the measures of exploration and perfonnance are essentially identical
between periods 10 and 200.
Insert Table 2 about here

A". we had seen previously , results for Pattern 4, the fully interdependent pattern, are

much more complex. Pattern 4 requires a high degree of both coordination and exploration.
Moreover, as argued in Table 1, the different governance modes differ widely in both the
coordination and exploration that they provide. We begin our discussion of Pattern 4 with
capability level A. In tl1is case, in the short run at period 10, tl1e integrated fonn has the highest
perfonnance, followed in order by the ratification, self-governing alliance and modular fonns.
The coordination f ailures metric mirrors w ell our previous discussion of coordination supplied by
the various governance modes (recall Table 1, Panel B): the integrated mode provides tl1e highest
degree of coordination (0 coordination failures), followed by the ratified mode (on average 3.1
coordination failures), the self-governing mode (6.0 failures) , and the modular mode (10.3
failures). It is interesting to note that in this case coordination failures predict short-run
perfonnance remarkably accurately. Moreover, this finding holds for all capability levels. Even if
a finn has higher short-term exploration, coordination appears to trump in the short run. For
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instance, as in Pattern 1, both the ratified and the self-governing modes have higher short-term
exploration than the integrated mode due to the parallel search processes that they are able to
engage in. However, more search, if uncoordinated, is likely to lead to some changes that are
perfonnance detrimental. These changes are particularly hannful in the short run, since finns do
not have enough time to potentially undo these maladaptive adjustments. A'> a consequence, the
integrated finn, despite its smaller degree of short-tenn exploration, outperforms the ratified and
self-governing (and modular) modes in the short run.
The explanation of long-run results is more complicated as both coordination and
exploration play critical roles. 1n the long run, finns have to engage in both to have high
perfonnance, yet tradeoff'> arise. As the exploration and coordination metrics in Table 3 indicate,
there is a general tradeoff between exploration and coordination: the modes that create much
exploration, such as the modular mode, also create many coordination failures, while the modes
that are good at coordination, such as the integrated mode, are less able to create broad
exploration.
Coming back to the results for capability level A, we can observe that in the long run the
short-run perfonnance results are exactly reversed. In the long run, the modular mode has the
highest level of perfonnance, followed by the self-governing alliance, and the ratified and
integrated fonns. The two long-run exploration mea'>ures (percent of choices evaluated at period
200 and tl1e number of sticking points) both confinn our previous discussion of exploration
supplied by the various governance modes (recall Table 1, Panel C). For instance, while the
integrated mode has 315 sticking points, tl1e modular form only gets stuck on about 84 points.
Likewise, the modular fonn evaluates in 200 periods about 590 different contribution values
(1.2% of all possible) while the integrated form looks at only 246 (0.5%). The differences in
exploration are reflected in perfonnance, as in this case, the long-run exploration metrics predict
well the performance ordering of the governance modes.
This direct match between long-run exploration and long-run perfonnance does not hold,
however, for all levels of organizational capability. As organizational capabilities are increased,
their effects on coordination failures and exploration differ across governance modes.
Consequently, the relative balance of exploration and coordination that is supplied by each mode
changes. For instance, an increase in the search radius or the number of alternatives is an
unambiguous good for the integrated mode. Coordination failures are unaffected (they stay at
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zero) while exploration increases. As a result, perfonnance increases as capabilities increase. For
all the other governance modes, however, increases in organizational capabilities are not
unambiguously beneficial. Generally, an increase in organizational search capabilities increases
exploration but also increases coordination failures. The more broadly managers search and the
more alternatives they evaluate, the more likely it is that at least one manager (within the finns or
within the alliance) will implement a change that is performance detrimental for the other agents
in the system. For instance, for the self-governing alliance, coordination failures increase from 6
(with Capability Level A) to 22 (for Capability Levels B and C) to 32 (for Capability Level D).
Similar patterns can be observed for the ratification and the modular modes. The impact of
increasing search capabilities at the level of the agents on long-run finn perfonnance is, hence,
ambiguous. For instance, while the modular mode increases its exploration dramatically between
Capability Levels A and D (the number of sticking points falls by a factor of 10 and the number
of choices evaluated increase by a factor of 10), its coordination failures also increase by a factor
of 7. A-; w e had seen in the short-run results, if coordination failures are too prevalent,
exploration does not yield perfonnance benefits: while it is helpful to search more broadly, if the
outcome of the search is uncoordinated, fmns' perfonnances will suffer. As a result, the long-run
perfonnance of the modular mode actually decreases from 0.842 to 0. 747 as organizational
capabilities are increased from Level A to Level D.
Insert Table 3 about here

In sum, the results highlight several key points. First, as suggested by Proposition 3, the
match between exploration and coordination demands and supply helps explain the perfonnance
outcomes ofthe various governance modes. In Pattern 1, in which little coordination was needed,
perfonnance differences among modes is well explained, both in the short and the long run, by
the degree of exploration that is supplied. In Pattern 4, in which coordination demands are very
high, coordination supply plays a pivotal role in explaining performance. For short-run
perfonnance, it tracks perfonnance perfectly. For long-run performance, if exploration is very
low (as with capability level A), exploration can trump coordination in explaining performance
differences; otherwise, coordination again appears to be more important in explaining
perfonnance. Second, in the absence of many interdependencies, increases in organizational
search capabilities are beneficial for all governance modes. In the presence of rich interactions,
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however, increases in organizational search capabilities can backfire. Even though increases in
organizational capabilities may have counterintuitive effects on perfonnance, their effects can be
explained by their consequences on exploration and coordination. While exploration increases
with greater organizational search capabilities, coordination failures increase as well.
Consequently, performance can suffer.
Results for Patterns 2 and 3 can be s imilarly ex plained. How ever, rather tl1an discussing
each sim ulation separately, we summarize our results compactly by reporting (in Table 4) tl1e
results of OLS regressions of performance (smn of Firm 1 and Finn 2) on our measures of
exploration (percent qf choices evaluated) and coordination (coordination failures). The
underlying dataset pools observations at eitl1er period 10 (short-run) or 200 (long-rm1) for tl1e four
patterns, four governance m odes an d four capability levels. We thus have 640,000 observations
for the short-run and the long-run regressions (4 x 4 x 4 x 10,000 simulations). To control for
pattern-level influences on performance we include pattern dmnmies for Patterns 2-4 (tlms
Pattern 1 is tl1e baseline); to examine the varying role of coordination and exploration as the
degree of interdependence changes we include interaction effects for

tlu~s e

dmnmies with tl1e

coordination and exploration measures. Since there are no coordination f ailures on Pattern 1,
coordination is only interacted w itl1 Pattern 3 and Pattern 4, so that Pattern 2 is tl1e baseline in this
case. For a given pattern, tl1e effect of either coordination or exploration is tlms captured by the
sum of the main effect and the pattern interaction.
The results in Table 4 confirm more systematically a nmnber of observations we had
made in our prior discussion. First, as interdependencies increase, coordination becomes
increasingly important: the interaction of coordination fa ilures witl1 tl1e pattern dummies, for
example, is significantly greater in magnitude for Pattern 4 tlmn w ith Pattern 3. Witl1 increasingly
dense interactions, coordination becomes paramount in explaining perfonnance. Second,
exploration is always important, but becomes less so with h igher degrees of interaction. These
results are true for botl1 tl1e short- and long-rm1, witl1 coordination even more important for
9

higher-interaction patterns in tl1e long-run. Figure 6 illustrates tl1e economic significance of tl1ese
regression results, graphing tl1e magnitude of tl1e perfonnance change associated with a one
9

All coefficients are significant with p<O.OOl: in addition, for each specification, all coefficient<; are
sign ificantly different from one another with p<O.OOl, with the exception of the inte raction terms
P3 *exploration and P4 *exploration for period 10, where the significance of the difference between these two
variables is with p<0.05.
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standard deviation change in either coordination or exploration. 10 As this figure illustrates, for
denser patterns coordination can become even more critical than exploration.
This last result is noteworthy. Most research on the value of exploration has stressed the
positive relationship between the value of exploration and the degree of interdependency (e.g.,
Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007). While we confinn this relationship, we find that in an interorganizational setting coordination may actually become even more important than exploration.
Exploration per se, when not coordinated, can backfire.
Insert Table 4 and Figure 6 about here

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have sought to better understand how modes of governance affect the
perfonnance of firms in alliance relationships. While collaboration is an important component of
finn strategy, and a growing body of work has focused on determinants of governance choice in
this setting, there is limited empirical evidence concerning the link between mode choice and finn
perfonnance. We drew from a body of work that has used simulation methodologies to address
issues central to strategy and organization design. In the remainder of this section we review our
core results and theoretical predictions; discuss assumptions made in our model; and end with a
discussion of how our study relates to and contributes to the literature in this area.

Results and theoretical predictions
We begin by reviewing our core results, noting how they relate to the propositions which were
derived from the prior literature, and offering a set of specific predictions for future work. ln
many cases our analysis has enabled us to uncov er additional nuance relative to the propositions
that can help guide future theoretical and empirical research. Beginning with Proposition 1, we
find that the pattern of interdependence among the activities of finns engaged in an alliance does
have a crucial impact on the optimal governance structure. ln addition to confinning this
prediction, we also find that the time horizon over which firms seek to maximize their

°

1

For ease of comparison, the deviation decrease in coordination f ailures negative of the coordination failure
effects are shown; thus the figure shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in exploration, and a one
standard.
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perfonnance has an important effect on optimal governance as well: as we saw with the fully
interdependent pattern and capability level A (Figure 5), governance modes that create high
short-tenn performance may not yield high long-tenn perfonnance, and vice versa. Thus,
knowing the pattern of interdependence alone may not suffice to decide on the optimal
governance mode.
Consistent with Propositions 2a and 2b, we find that the need for and supply of
coordination and exploration is affected by the pattern of interdependence, governance modes and
organizational search capabilities. We discover considerable subtlety, however, on the supply
side, as governance choice and search capabilities interact with one another. As we saw in Table
3, increases in organizational search capabilities can increase exploration but also coordination
failures. Moreover, the degree to which search capabilities increase coordination failures is
strongly mediated by the governance mode. For instance, while the integrated mode was
unaffected, coordination failures in the modular mode soared with increases in organizational
search capabilities. This interaction can make simple predictions as to which governance mode
provides more coordination difficult. For instance, while the degree of coordination failures
generally followed the trend we anticipated in Panel B of Table 1 (most coordination is provided
by the integrated mode, followed by the ratified alliance, the self-governing alliance, and the
modular mode), we found situations in which the ratified alliance actually creates more
coordination failures than the self-governing alliance. This happens in particular when
interdependencies are nmnerous and agents evaluate many alternatives (see Table 3, capability
levels B and D). 11
Finally, consistent with the argmnents leading to Proposition 3, we find that finn
perfonnance in an alliance relationship improves when coordination and exploration needs are
matched with coordination and exploration supplied. Our results, however, also reveal that the
match on the coordination and the exploration dimension is not always equally important. As the
11

The reason for why the ratified alliance has more coordination failures in this case than the self-governing
alliance is quite subtle. Recall, in the ratified alliance, the managers of the non-alliance activities move first.
Given high interdependency and many alternatives considered, it is likely that at least one manager will find and
implement a change that is performance enhancing for her own firm, but potentially performance destroying for
the other firm. In the self-governing alliance, the alliance moves first. In this case, the alliance achieves higher
performance (since they can optimize parochially and do not need ratification). This higher performance
increases the bar for the non-alliance managers for finding a better alternative. (Recall, non-alliance managers
take 112 of the alliance performance into account in making evaluations). /\s a result, in this case, non-alliance
managers are Jess likely to find a (parochially) performance enhancing move which, given the high
interdependency, could undermine the performance of the other firm.
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degree of interdependence increases, the value of having a good match on the coordination
dimension increases. For very high levels of interdependence, coordination can actually trump
exploration. Even though high levels of interdependence require a high degree of exploration,
unless this exploration is tied to coordination, it can be ineffective.
As discussed at the beginning of this paper, empirical results concerning the perfonnance
impact of alliances are mixed; moreover, there exists only limited empirical evidence examining
the perfonnance implications of alternate modes of governance. The results of our model suggest
that clear-cut empirical results may require a greater focus on the interaction of factors such as
interdependence, capabilities and governance mode. In particular, our results offer three specific
predictions that could guide future empirical work:
( 1) ln the absence of strong organizational search capabilities, when activity
interdependence is pervasive, the perfonnance benefit of a fully-integrated alliance
governance mode relative to less-integrated modes will decline over time.

(2) When activity interdependence is pervasive, in alliances with weak coordinating
mechanisms, fmn performance may decline as finns' search capabilities become
stronger.
(3) When activity interdependence is pervasive, the relative importance of selecting highcoordination governance modes as compared to high-exploration modes will
mcrease.

Simulation model assumptions
We next discuss several assumptions embedded in our model and elaborate on the implications
for our results (and for future extensions) of relaxing some of these assumptions. First, we
modeled an alliance situation with two firms. lt is not uncommon, however, for alliances to
involve more than two finns. In such cases, we would expect that similar issues of coordination
and exploration would come into play. The main question, then, is how firms can design a set of
governance structures that take into account the complex ities associated with having a greater
nmnber of involved parties. For instance, an appropriate methodology for ratifYing joint decisions
in such a setting w ould likely involve a more complex set of rules given the larger number of
players. At the same time, we would expect that the core issue is likely to be the same as in a twofinn setting: how can the need for coordination and exploration arising from the pattern of inter-
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finn interdependence be matched with the supply of coordination and exploration arising from
inter-firm governance of decision-making and finn capabilities?
A second modeling assumption involves the portion of the alliance profit each fmn takes
into account in making decisions (the parameter

<X

in our model). In our analysis, we have

assumed that both firms put equal weight on alliance perfonnance. One might imagine, however,
situations in which the alliance is considered of greater importance by one finn than by the other.
How are our results affected in such a situation? We take a first cut at exploring this by
examining our results in the case where Firm I ha'i

<X= 0.75

and Finn 2 has ex= 0.25 (for the

alliance modes). Re-running our model on Patterns I and 4, and focusing on the two alliance
modes (self-governing and ratified), we fmd that, as expected, on Pattern I there are no
significant differences between the original, 'balanced' alliance results and the alternative,
'asymmetric' alliance results (due to the lack of interdependencies between the alliance and nonalliance activities). With Pattern 4, however, we find an interesting set of results: alliance
asytmnetry reduces the performance of Firm I (with the 0.75 weight), while increasing the
perfonnance of Finn 2, for both the self-governing and ratified modes. The finn with a higher
emphasis on the alliance suffers largely because the other finn now has a stronger incentive to
implement choices that improve perfonnance of its non-alliance activities (N 2 ) but that are
detrimental to the alliance and hence to the other finn. (Since ex is low, Finn 2 bears less of the
negative externality it imposes onto the alliance.) This parochial behavior can lead to situations in
which even joint profits are lower than in the symmetric case. These results raise the question for
future research of how fmns can create modes with effective coordination when finns differ in
the degree to which they consider the joint alliance to be important.
A third modeling assumption relates to the implications of pre-defining a task allocation
structure. Because we pre-specify the tasks that comprise the alliance, we are effectively making
the choice of alliance scope exogenous. This choice, however, is likely intertwined with a host of
other issues related to interdependence, finn capabilities and governance mode. We conducted
several robustness analyses to better understand the implications of thinking about alliance
boundaries in this way. The task decomposition we have used in this paper has been a 4-4-4 split
between Finn I, the Alliance and Finn 2. We evaluated two alternative task decomposition
structures: a 5-2-5 and a 3-6-3 structure, on which we examined the results ofthe self-governing
and ratified alliance modes. The results suggest that the alliance boundary issue can be explained
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in connection with the governance structures: the results of the 5-2-5 structure closely resemble
the modular results, while the 3-6-3 structure creates results that tend to resemble those of the
integrated mode. Thus, while the choice of boundaries may in reality be an endogenous
consideration for finns, we can think about these as more continuous versions of the gov ernance
structures. The modes we evaluate, therefore, represent discrete points among the continumn of
choices available to finns, with task allocation being subsumed as an issue within the governance
structure decision.
Lastly, we should note that our findings have parallels with results from prior efforts
using quite different simulation methods to address organizational issues. Burton and Obel ( 1980;
1984), for example, utilize a decomposed linear programming methodology (Dantzig (1963);
Baumol and Fabian (1964)) to address intra-finn organization issues. They find that finn
perfonnance under alternate divisional forms (e.g., M -fonn vs. U-fonn) is influenced by the
degree of decomposability of the fmn' s underlying technology. 1n particular, their results suggest
that the benefits of the more decentralized M-fonn structure are more apparent for more nearly
decomposable technologies. This relates to our own finding, where on Pattern 1, which is fully
decomposable, the more decentralized 'ratification' mode perfonns better than the more
centralized ' integrated' mode (with the opposite generally true on the less decomposable Pattern
4). lt is reassuring to note that different modeling approaches can result in parallels such as these.
On the other hand, different approaches can also lead to new insights, as our results linking
variation in interdependencies of various types (within and across firms and their alliance
activities) with alternate alliance governance structures suggests.

Contributions and implications
Our study has a number of implications for theory and future research in this area. The
observation that coordination challenges can trmnp exploration in inter-organizational settings
underscores the importance of evaluating the contingent implications of interdependence when
structuring cooperative relationships. This is consistent with Gulati and Singh's (1998) discussion
of coordination as a relevant concern when structuring alliance governance. Moreover, because
we abstract away from the technology and industry-related factors that underlie transaction costrelated considerations of appropriability (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Ox ley, 1997) we can focus more
specifically on identifying the sources of coordination and exploration supply, allowing a more
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targeted approach to understanding the tradeoffs associated with governance mode design. For
example, while some prior work has drawn on arguments related to capabilities and
interdependence in discussing the determinants of governance mode, much of this w ork has
utilized fairly broad proxies for hierarchical controls such as the use of equity (e.g., Colombo,
2003). Having a more contingent view of the potential implications of specific governance mode
design considerations (as we attempt to do in this paper) can enable more targeted research
approaches.
A core set of results in this study relates to the ways in which governance structure
interacts with organizational search capabilities. These results are particularly intriguing given the
attention paid to the role of firm-level factors such as alliance capabilities in recent studies. For
example, Kale et al. (2002), building on the idea that greater alliance experience can have
positive performance effects (Anand and Khanna, 2000), discuss the role of a ' dedicated alliance
function ' in capturing and managing alliance-relate knowledge, suggesting that such a function
can enable the development of alliance capabilities through learning and evolutionary processes
(March, 1991; Nelson and Winter, 1982).1n much the same spirit, Zollo et al. (2002) develop the
idea of inter-organizational routines, which also follow a similar evolutionary path. Our concept
of organizational search capabilities shares a number of features w ith these various concepts: they
are assets tied to the finn and developed over time that endow finn agents with superior
evaluation capabilities in the context of inter-organizational relationships. Whereas prior studies
have generally stressed the positive relationship between alliance capabilities and firm
perfonnance, our analysis suggests that there are contingencies under which investments in the
development of these capabilities may actually backfire.
This paper also contributes to the broader conversation around the performance
consequences of inter-organizational relationships. Various streams of prior work have examined
the effects of alliances on different metrics of firm perfonnance, looking at outcomes such as firm
survival (e.g., Bamn and Oliver, 1991), innovation output (e.g., Shan et al., 1994) and stock
market valuation (Das et al., 1998). While these studies generally find positive effects, albeit with
a range of contingencies, other studies paint a more mixed view, for example when comparing
inter-organizational relationships with firm capabilities w ith respect to their impact on
perfonnance (e.g., Lee et al., 2001). Much of the variance in alliance-related firm performance
outcomes is likely due to partner and inter-finn characteristics (e.g., Stuart, 2000); by illustrating
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how factors such as search capabilities and interdependence can influence the governanceperfonnance link, our study can shed new light on this area, w ith future w ork focused more
specifically on empirically testing the predictions of our model.
A key aim of this paper ha'i been to develop a set of insights that can be used to guide
future empirical w ork. In this context, the use of factors such as inter-organizational patterns of
interdependence does increase the burden of collecting empirical data that is more fine-grained
and complex. At the same time, however, the simulation results can help generate more refined
hypotheses that have the opposite effect of simplifying the data collection task. With more
specific priors (e.g., in more interdependent settings, modes that enable greater coordination are
preferred to modes that enable greater exploration), future work can explore the governance
implications of inter-organizational collaboration in a more targeted w ay using empirical and
case-based studies.
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Figure 1
Conceptual model: governance mode, capabilities and interdependence
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Figure 2
Inter-firm interdependence
A. Interaction matrix example
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Figure 3
Summary of governance structures
Governance
Structure

Agents and
Policies
Controlled

Decision Making
Sequence

Metrics for
Evaluating Decisions

Oversight and
Hierarchy

Modular

TwoAgenl<>
Control F1 and
F2, respectively

Own-firm profit,
F1 andF2

None

(MOD)

Firms 1 and 2
(simultaneDusly)

Self-Governing
Alliance

Three Agent<>

1. Alliance

Alliance profit for A

None

Control N1 ,
A l-A2, and N2,
respectively

2. Firms 1 and 2
(simultaneously
with respect to
N 1 and N2)

Own-firm profit plus
portion (a) of alliance
profit for F1 and F2

Three Agent<>

l. Firms 1 and 2

Alliance profit for A

(SGA)

Ratified
Alliance
(RAT)

Control N1 ,
A1-A2, and N2,
respectively

(simultaneously
with respect to
N 1 and N2)

Own-firm profit plus
portion (a) of alliance
profit for F1 and F2

F1 and F2 must
ratify alliance
proposals

2. Alliance
3. Firms 1 and 2
ratify alliance
... . ....... . .._... .___. . ....... . ....... ..--.. . .___. _. ____.....--... .--.. . ..__. . ____.. .P....!~£~~-~~. ....-... . __. . ____... ..- .. . - . . . . .- .... .- . . . - . . . ..- . . . - . . . .- ......- .....- .... - -·-·-·---·-·-··
Integrated
One Agent
Single decision
Own-firm profit,
Implicit full
(INT)
Controls all policy maker
combining F 1+F2
oversight
choices

40

Figure 4
Performance levels of four governance modes: interdependence pattern 1
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Figure 5
Performance levels of four governance modes: interdependence pattern 4
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These figures graph pcrtormancc (vertical axis) tor the two-firm system over time periods 0 to 200
(horizontal axis) tor the tour governance modes on Intcrdcpcndcncc Pattern 4 (full interdependence), with
varying levels of organizational capabilities. Each point on each line represents the average of 10,000
simulation runs. MOD, SGA, RAT and INT rcter to the modular, self-governing all iancc, ratiticd alliance,
and integrated torms, respectively.
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200

Figure 6
Magnitude of coordination and exploration effects
Performance impact, period 10:
Effect of a one standard deviation change in coordination or exploration
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Performance impact, period 200:
Effect of a one standard deviation change in coordination or exploration
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These figures show the change in performance associated with a one standard deviation change in
coordination or exploration. Values arc calculated using the estimated coefficients from Table 5 evaluated
at the mean value of coordination (coordination failures) and exploration (percent ofchoices evaluated)
tor each pattern. Coordination values shown represent the negative of the coordination failures cftcct to
facilitate exposition.
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Table 1
Demand and supply of coordination and exploration
A. Level of coordination and exploration demanded by the interdependence pattern

Between Firms 1, 2
and Alliance

Within Alliance

Between Firms 1, 2

Exploration
Demanded
(Number of
Local Peaks)

Pattern 1

None

Little

None

18

Pattern 2

None

High

None

35

Pattern 3

High

High

None

198

Pattern 4

High

High

High

315

Coordination Demanded

B. Level of coordination supplied by governance modes
Between
Firms 1, 2
and Alliance

Within
Alliance

Between
Firms 1, 2

Sources of
Coordination Supply

MOD

Low

Low

None

• No formal mechanism, but individual
firms control subset of alliance activities

SGA

Low

High

None

• Sequential moves within period
• Firms consider alliance performance
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Medium

High
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• Sequential moves within period
• Firms consider alliance performance
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High

High

High

• Single decision maker

C. Level of exploration supplied b)· governance modes

Exploration
Level

Exploration
Influences

MOD, SGA, RAT and INT rcter to the modular, self-governing alliance, ratified alliance, and integrated
governance modes, respectively.
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Table 2
Performance, exploration and coordination, interdependence pattern 1

Capability
Level

A

Degree of Exploration
Percent of Choices I Sticking
t--""':"":'-......---::-:--:--i··. · -···__!:,val.~-~-~~~-~ -·-···· ....J Points
p.200
p. 10 . p.200 .
p. lO
MOD
0.898
0.931
34.7
45.2
18.0
SGA
0.916
0.930
40.1
45.2
20.3
RAT
0.917
0.931
40.0
45.2
19.0
, INT
0.849 , 0.931
25.3 , 45.2 , 18.5
Gov.
Mode

Performance

Coordination
Failures
0
0
0
0

-··-·· -·- ·-·- . ...... ·Man-··-· ·a:9sT···--<- · ··o:9sT·-- ···- ss.3·- · ·•······ ·ss.·3····· ·....... _i7~9···-- ·-··-· ··-··· o-· ·-·-· ··B

sGA

RAT

0.951
0.951

0.951
0.951

55.3
55.3

55.3
55.3

19.8
18.5

0
0

-·-··-·-··-·-·"··-·-··-·~····~-""" -···.~~~t~-··"-1-"" -~"~~~-- . . .-~~ :~-. . .,....'" .~;:-~ ·· ""'·t-·"··-\~:{-··--· ··-··-·····-·--~-·····-·-·. -·-

c

SGA

RAT

0.944
0.944

0.986
0.986

53.6
53.6

81.4
81.4

2.5
2.3

0
0

0.993
0.993
0.990

0.993
0.993
0.990

89.6
89.6
90.7

89.6
89.6
90.7

2.3
2.0
2.2

0
0
0

-·· ·-· · ·-·-· ··-·-· ·-·. .····~ri- · · -- -~~~~~-· --t·· · ··%·~~~·--- ···-~~:~·- ··•···· ' ·~~:-~-· "''" ~-·· · -~-~~-·· ·-- · -··-··· ··-···· ··~-··· · ·-·-··· ··D

SGA

RAT
INT

MOD, SGA, RAT and INT rcter to the modular, self-governing alliance, ratified alliance, and integrated
forms, respectively. Performance refers to the sum of Firm 1 and Firm 2 performance at periods 10 and
200. Exploration is measured using two different mctrics: ( 1) percent ofchoices evaluated: the running
total of all contribution values accessed by the two firms at periods 10 and 200 as a result of the firms'
decision making processes divided by the total number of such values on the landscape; and (2) sticking
points: the average number of points on the landscape from which the two-firm system will not move.
Coordination failures arc measured as the number of periods between the beginning of the simulation and
period 200 that total profit (Firm 1 and Firm 2) declines from one period to the next. All measures (except
sticking points) arc evaluated and averaged across 10,000 simulat ions. Sticking points arc averaged over
100 simulation runs.
*Pattern 1 has a total of 144 possible contribution values that can be evaluated.
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Table 3
Performance, exploration and coordination, interdependence pattern 4

Capability
Level

A

- -----------··
B

Gov.
Mode

Performance

Degree of Exploration
Percent of Choices I

Evaluated*

! Sticking

Coordination
Failures

···- ..- ·............ ............... > Points
p. lO
p.200
p. 10
p.200
MOD
0.747
0.842
0.3
1.2
83.8
10.3
SGA
0.768
0.833
0.4
1.0
97.5
6.0
RAT
0.784
0.829
0.3
0.7
193.1
3.1
TNT ... __ _Q:.?_?.§__-.!- . __0_:_~~5? _____ _
9-~---··: .... . ._9.: ~-. _... .. !.... _]}.~.:_!____ ........ ________9__·----......
--j--M-on- o.731 j o.761
1.2
! 1.7 j 83.8
47.0
SGA
0.790 . 0.807
1.0
.
1.1
. 97.5
21.9
RAT
0.776
0.781
0.9
0.9
193.1
30.5
TNT
0.845
0.845
0.7
0.7
315.1
0
t - - - - - . - - - - - i · ·. ··-

-·-··-·----·-··· ·-·-··-·r-·-·M-a-o····----·.o:74o···. --r--·. -o.i is·- - . . ·- ·a.3·- · . .,....·. ·4:3··· ·-··r-·. ··--s·~-.s- ··--· --------------35~7·-----. ·---c
- ...... --- ----

D

sGA
0.760
0.865
RAT
0.781
0.873
• .L.... -~!.__. . -· .Q:ll_
QQ__--'-· __<!:~2.? -- ···MOD
0.690 . 0.747
SGA
0.780
0.831
RAT
0.781
0.795
TNT
0.912
0.912

0.5
3.6
20.4
21.6
0.5
2.2
50.1
9.6
·9.3 .._ ..! .... .. ..?.: ~- ...".. L.......-~..!.:2. . .___-----________9__·--4.6
. 12.3 .
8.5
71.6
3.0
4.6
20.4
32.4
2.6
3.0
50.1
42.9
4.0
4.0
51.9
0

MOD, SGA, RAT and TNT rctcr to the modular, self-governing alliance, ratified alliance, and integrated
forms, respectively. Performance rctcrs to the sum of Firm 1 and Firm 2 performance at periods 10 and
200. Exploration is measured using two different mctrics: ( 1) percent of choices evaluated: the running
total of all contribution values accessed by the two tirms at periods 10 and 200 as a result of the tirms'
decision making processes divided by the total number of such values on the landscape; and (2) sticking
points: the average number of points on the landscape from which the two-tirm system will not move.
Coordination failures arc measured as the number of periods between the beginning of the simulation and
period 200 that total profit (Firm 1 and Firm 2) declines from one period to the next. All measures (except
sticking points) arc evaluated and averaged across 10,000 simulat ions. Sticking points arc avcmgcd over
100 simulation runs.
*Pattern 4 has a total of49,152 possible contribution values that can be evaluated.
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Table 4
Relative effects of coordination and exploration

Dependent variable:
Per/(Jrmance
Coordination failure
Exploration
P2 dummy
P3 dummy
P4 dummy
P3 * coord.failure
P4 * coord. failure
P2 * e.Tploration
P3 * e.Tploration
P4 * e.Tploration
Constant
ModelR-

(4-1)
period 10

-0.156
0.189
-0.012
-0.005
-0.028
-0.085
-0.191
0.013
0.948
0.871
0.830

(4-2)
period 200

[0.002]
[0.001]
[0.001]
[0.001]
[0.001]
[0.002]
[0.002]
[0.001]
[0.008]
[0.013]
[0.0011
0.5 18

-0.161
0.135
-0.016
-0.010
-0.01 1
-0.105
-0.269
0.013
0.528
0.276
0.873

[0.001]
[0.001]
[0.001]
[0.001]
[0.001]
[0.002]
[0.002]
[0.001]
[0.005]
[0.004]
[0.0011
0.574

This table shows OLS regressions offirm performance (sum of Firm 1 and Firm 2) at period 10 or period
200. Exploration is measured by percent ofchoices evaluated and coordination failure is measured by
coordination failure percent. All coefficients arc s igniticant at the p < 0.001 level. Each spccitication
contains 640,000 observations: 4 patterns, 4 governance modes and 4 capability levels, across 10,000
simulations.
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